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Entry Denied: Japan’s Border Restrictions in the Time of the COVID-19 Emergency
With the outbreak of SARS-CoV-2 and the resulting COVID-19 pandemic, Japan 
adopted controversial policies to contain the virus. Unlike many highly developed 
countries, it enacted strict policies banning entry through its borders to all non- 
Japanese citizens regardless of their residency status. The further peculiarity is that 
these measures equalized low-skill and high-skill foreign workers, affecting them 
identically. Along with describing how the emergency has been handled in relation 
to foreign nationals, this article highlights how pre-existing socio-cultural dynamics 
of differentiation between “insiders” and “outsiders” have evolved in response to 
the pandemic.
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IZVLEČEK
Vstop zavrnjen: Japonske mejne omejitve v času izrednih razmer med  
pandemijo Covida-19
Z izbruhom virusa SARS-CoV-2 in posledično pandemije Covida-19 je Japonska za za-
jezitev virusa sprejela sporne ukrepe. V nasprotju s številnimi visoko razvitimi državami 
je vsem nejaponskim državljanom, ne glede na njihov bivalni status, strogo prepove-
dala prehajanje meja. Ti ukrepi so enako prizadeli tako visoko- kot nizkokvalificirane 
tuje delavce. Članek obravnava izvajanje izrednih ukrepov v povezavi s tujci, hkrati pa 
pojasnjuje razvoj že obstoječe sociokulturne dinamike razlikovanja med »našimi« in 
»vašimi« ob soočenju s pandemijo.
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INTRODUCTION
The crisis caused by the virus responsible for COVID-19 is not over yet, and the bat-
tle to return to a pre-crisis state is likely to be a long one. The virus SARS-CoV-2 has 
changed the social dynamics that we have all taken for granted. Our current situa-
tion seems to be an all-encompassing “revolution” in social, economic, political, and 
cultural life.
Japan is a prominent case regarding the paradoxes that have emerged from the 
pandemic: on the one hand, it has always been reluctant to accept non-skilled for-
eign workers to overcome its structural and labor shortage problems, while on the 
other, for the first time in its history, it opened up (albeit in a limited way) to low 
and semi-skilled immigration in 2018 (Hamaguchi 2019: 2–5). However, shortly after 
this opening, Japan faced the unforeseen consequences that the novel coronavirus 
brought to its migration policies.1 The paradox is that, at this historical moment of 
Japan’s opening to a type of immigration that had hitherto been rejected, COVID-19 
revived, broadened, and strengthened closure policies, also affecting those who 
have lived and worked in Japan for years, i.e., permanent and long-term foreign na-
tionals (Arudou 2020c; 2020d).
This article describes how the pandemic emergency has been handled in Japan 
in relation to foreign nationals living in the archipelago and how Japan’s response 
to security and health concerns in this respect has exacerbated pre-existing prob-
lematic dynamics and racial issues in its society. My argumentation is based on the 
results of research conducted on secondary sources varying in length and argumen-
tative depth. As the situation is constantly evolving and because of the shortage of 
academic material due to the recentness of the topic, online articles, blog posts, and 
online interviews made up the majority of the consulted literature. First, I sum up the 
theory of the dynamics related to migration and control policies in general, focus-
ing on differentiated treatment, border control issues, and cultural peculiarities. On 
these grounds, the second part introduces the events related to the re-entry ban for 
foreigners into Japan in 2020 and discusses the differentiation tendencies present in 
today’s Japanese society. The conclusion provides speculations and forecasts about 
the present and future of the problem of social “othering” in Japan.
This article’s key findings highlight how the dynamics of differentiation already 
embedded in the Japanese society between those who are part of it (“insiders”/Japa-
nese) and those who are excluded (“outsiders”/foreigners) (Reischauer 1995: 396; Brody 
2002: 1–7), have changed and evolved in response to the peculiarity of the COVID-19 
emergency. The almost unique feature of this situation is that, although usually high-
1 Japan has been criticized for having one of the most restrictive migration policies among 
advanced industrial countries (Tsuda, Cornelius 2004: 449), based on control and lacking in 
policies of social incorporation or active socio-political participation (Shipper 2008: 25). For 
further discussion, see Tsuda and Cornelius (2004) and Shipper (2008). On issues concerning 
public policy and racial discrimination, see Arudou (2015).
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skilled migrant workers are in a privileged position compared to low-skilled migrant 
workers in the receiving societies, this binary division between insiders and outsid-
ers has exceptionally equalized, balanced, and almost flattened the difference in Ja-
pan between foreign blue-collars and foreign managers (and also foreign investors), 
bringing them together in the social differentiation and exclusionary process within 
the archipelago.
BORDERS, MIGRATION, MULTICULTURALISM, AND CONTROL
Borders traditionally create a geographical separation of different political entities 
and legal jurisdictions. Through them, the state controls its territory, the mobility of 
people, and security. Moreover, they have the function of dividing not only physical 
territories but people, too (Loftus 2015: 115). Borders act as a separating element 
between different categories of people, filtering out those who can be admitted 
and be a part (to varying degrees) of the country and those who must be excluded. 
Border regimes can act as a dividing element of gender (Gerard, Pickering 2012: 
514–533), race, and ethnicity (Weber, Bowling 2008: 355–375), but also of other so-
cial categories. How national policies and laws control and exclude specific catego-
ries of people are part of border enforcement policies (Bosworth 2008: 199–215). 
The ability to move across international borders depends on national migration 
policies, which in turn depend on a specific national policy regime. Migration policy 
regimes have not been immutable, and their present-day “cumbersomeness” is a 
very recent construct. Indeed, the transformation from a “free-entry” regime to one 
of control and regulation was triggered by the development of the concept of “citi-
zenship” and its legal recognition,2 which has triggered an increasingly complex and 
heterogeneous regulatory and normative evolution of national migration policies 
(Klugman, Pereira 2009). 
In this analysis, the context of border policies is the COVID-19 pandemic, which 
overlaps with the rules and laws of the pre-existing national migration structures. 
The application of strict directives on entry into and exit from a country at a time 
of a pandemic crisis, even to the point of total closure of the nation, is undoubtedly 
driven by social and health security logics. What is surprising about Japan’s border 
restrictions is the process of differentiation between insiders and outsiders, which is 
not new at all in Japanese society (Arudou 2015).
2 The time of introducing the concept of citizenship varies by country. For example, such his-
torical countries as France and Australia introduced the concept of citizenship in the nine-
teenth century and the mid-twentieth century, respectively (Klugman, Pereira 2009).
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Furthermore, Japan is in the so-called age of tabunka kyōsei (multicultural co- 
living),3 a concept prevailing since the 1990s4 in the integration practices of mi-
grants in Japanese society (Kashiwazaki 2013: 31–47). Broadly speaking, tabunka 
kyōsei is a concept of coexistence between Japanese citizens and foreign nationals, 
in a mutual effort to create a society in which people live and work together, with the 
respect attributed to living within the same community, regardless of nationality or 
ethnic background. In this idea also lie concepts of cultural diversity and the general 
fight against forms of racism (Kashiwazaki 2013: 39–42). However, tabunka kyōsei 
practices have failed to eliminate the fundamental dichotomy in Japanese society 
between Japanese and foreigners,5 maintaining this implicit institutionalized polar-
ization, not least because the Japanese government has refused to make the multi-
cultural question a matter of national debate (Kashiwazaki 2009: 121–146). This ap-
parent paradox and persistent division within a broader policy of “multi culturalism” 
can also be glimpsed in the adaptive differentiation between insiders and outsiders 
that re-emerged in response to COVID-19 and related border policies.
NEW IMMIGRATION LAW, OLD PARADOXES
On December 8, 2018, Japan’s Diet passed a historic amendment to the Immigration 
Control and Refugee Recognition Act (ICRRA), establishing for the first time the pos-
sibility for low and semi-skilled foreign workers to enter and work in the country (Ha-
maguchi 2019: 2–5).6 Although the amendment is not utterly revolutionary as it al-
lows the entry of foreign workers with strict limits, for the first time, there has been a 
step back from the constant official Japanese policy rhetoric of “closing” to any form 
of non-skilled immigration. In fact, the law enabled in April 2019 two new residen-
cy statuses, the tokutei ginō ichi gō (specified skilled type 1) and the tokutei ginō ni gō 
3 Literally, “multi-cultural-together-living”, translatable as “multicultural coexistence,” too. It 
can be considered as the Japanese version of multiculturalism. However, it is quite distinct 
from tabunka shugi, a term associated with multiculturalism in classic immigration countries 
(e.g., the USA, Canada, and Australia), as they are considered extremely different from the 
Japanese society (Kashiwazaki 2013: 31–32; 2016: 4–5). For more on tabunka kyōsei and its 
origins, see Kashiwazaki (2013, 2016).
4 The notion has only entered the vocabulary of local and national policy-making institutions 
since the 2000s (Kashiwazaki 2013: 41).
5 Morris-Suzuki criticized tabunka kyōsei describing it as “cosmetic multiculturalism” since it is 
based on the binary opposition between Japanese and foreigners (Morris-Suzuki 2002).
6 Since the 1980s, the government has introduced several amendments to ICRRA, each time 
proposing amendments for opening the country to some forms of unskilled labor. The most 
important ones were the 1989 amendment that resulted in the creation of the “side door” for 
South American nikkeijin, Japanese emigrants and their descendants, especially from Brazil 
and other South American countries (Brody 2002: 2–4, 53–86; Shipper 2008: 25–26, 37–41), 
the creation of the Technical Intern Training Program in 1993 that introduced foreign “train-
ees” and “technical interns,” and the Technical Internship Act of 2016 that changed the over-
all length of the technical intern program (Hamaguchi 2019: 2–5).
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(specified skilled type 2), the former of which allows low and semi-skilled laborers to 
enter and work in the country.
The significance of this amendment was far-reaching since, until the end of 
2018, Japan had always been a country that refused to rely on immigration7 despite 
its structural problems of low birth rate, rapidly aging population, and shrinking 
working-age population.8 Its position was almost unique among OECD countries, at 
least for the constancy with which it “imposed” itself on this line of thought.
However, COVID-19 has created an unexpected situation wherein not only did 
Japan’s labor market suffer a severe setback (as did all global production systems), 
but it also caused policy choices pointing against the process of “opening up” to 
immigration; a process that had only started in late 2018.
At the beginning of the health crisis, the Japanese government closed the ar-
chipelago to the entry of any foreigners, even those with permanent resident sta-
tus, with lives and families in the archipelago.9 The re-entry restrictions placed all 
non-Japanese citizens ineligible for re-entry, making their statuses the same as those 
of tourists, metaphorically, “guests.”10
Since April 3, 2020, when a general closure of the country’s borders against 
any form of inbound travel was declared,11 Japan has had a unique policy toward 
foreigners. All foreign residents who were abroad at the time have generally been 
banned from re-entering in Japan (even permanent and long-term residents),12 ex-
cept for a limited set of extraordinary humanitarian cases (Dooley 2020). Japanese 
nationals could freely leave and re-enter the archipelago after being subjected to 
testing and subsequent quarantine (Arudou 2020d). This measure had the further 
effect of locking foreign nationals inside the country for fear of not being able to re-
turn, thus precluding them from going back to their country of origin. The method 
for determining the limited cases of “humanitarian” nature even remained unclear, 
relegating the discretion of choice to the immigration officials assigned to each case 
(Kopp 2020a).
  7 There is a discrepancy between the official stance of the Japanese government and the de 
facto immigration situation in the archipelago. Although there is a de facto immigration re-
gime for semi-skilled and unskilled foreign workers through the various ICRRA amendments 
that have created different channels of entry to the country for categories such as South 
American nikkeijin and trainees, as well as marriage migration, officially Japan has not been 
open to any form of unskilled foreign labor. However, these specific forms of entry have de 
facto allowed creating so-called “side doors” as a legal solution to its endemic labor shortage 
problems (Brody 2002: 2–4, 40–43, 59).
  8 For more information about Japan’s structural problems, see Coulmas (2007), Suzuki (2013), 
and Dallin (2016).
  9 Permanent residence in Japan is called eijū-ken.
10 Indeed, Arudou described this as “guestism” (2020c; 2020b).
11 As “a temporary measure aimed at curtailing the spread of viral transmissions in Japan” 
(Ōsumi 2020).
12 Long-term residence in Japan is called teijū-sha.
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This process of differentiation has deeper implications. Allowing only indigenous 
citizens to re-enter Japan unwittingly creates an ethnic association with being im-
mune to the virus “by dint of a passport” (Arudou 2021). Vice versa, by reconstructing 
the origins of COVID-19 as something “foreign” (Arudou 2020a; Takahashi 2020; Su et 
al. 2020), non-Japanese citizens are categorized as more contagious than Japanese. 
Historically, it has already happened that during other epidemics,13 foreigners were 
considered more contagious or dangerous than Japanese, and even that Japanese 
were considered somehow immune to the virus (Arudou 2020a).14 Far from being 
the only country to have imposed travel limitations and border closure, Japan was 
the only member of the Group of Advanced Countries (G-7) to enforce such strict 
restrictions (Dooley 2020; Ōsumi 2020), thus becoming an outlier in respect to the 
other developed countries (Arudou 2020c).
Compared to a general history of the international community’s indifference 
on matters related to foreigners’ discrimination in Japan, this time, there was an 
unexpectedly high number of criticisms coming from various national15 and in-
ternational authorities. For instance, president of the European Business Council 
in Japan (EBC) Michael Mroczek strongly criticized the travel restrictions imposed 
by the Japanese government during the pandemic, pointing out that there was a 
clear dissonance between the rigidity imposed on foreign nationals and Japanese 
citizens. This differential treatment could lead to heavy criticism from businesses 
dealing with transborder trades of goods and services, to the point of risking that 
they might decide to move their Asian headquarters to countries other than Japan 
(Mrozczek 2020; Penn 2020).
After an initial joint statement on “Re-Entry of Foreign Residents to Japan” on 
behalf of the international business community (ACCJ 2020a), on July 7, 2020, the 
American Chamber of Commerce in Japan (ACCJ) issued a second letter of protest to 
the Japanese immigration authorities (Penn 2020), calling on the Japanese govern-
ment to provide equal treatment for all citizens, regardless of nationality. Requests 
included a clear timetable for the reopening of travel and clearer and streamlined 
policies for re-entry admissions, noting that foreign nationals have contributed to 
the Japanese economy and society and pose no greater risk than Japanese citizens. 
Christopher J. LaFleur, Chairman of the American Chamber of Commerce in Japan, 
13 For example, during other epidemics (SARS outbreak in 2002–2003 and H1N1 swine flu in 
2009), hotels and other facilities refused to provide their services to foreigners, above all 
Chinese nationals, implying that the virus and contagiousness came from “outside” (Aru-
dou 2020a).
14 Politicians and the media in turn instrumentalized COVID-19 by portraying it as a “foreign 
virus” and labeling it as “Wuhan virus” or “Chinese virus,” thus hindering an accurate percep-
tion of the virus’s origins and creating potential biases (Takahashi 2020; Su et al. 2020).
15 Noteworthy are an editorial published in the Asahi Shimbun of June 8, 2020, which called 
the re-entry ban policies “discriminatory” and “unreasonable,” and the petition made by the 
Japan Association of National Universities requesting Japan’s Ministry of Education to have 
their researchers and university students readmitted (Arudou 2020c).
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stated that “foreign residents of Japan who have made a decision to build a life 
here and contribute to the Japanese economy should not be subject to a double 
standard restricting their travel, economic, and familial opportunities based on 
nationality,” and that “while we applaud and support the Japanese government’s 
efforts to manage the COVID-19 crisis, a resident’s nationality provides no basis on 
which to assess risk or assign travel privilege in relation to COVID-19” (ACCJ 2020b; 
2020c). On July 22, 2020, during a conference of the Foreign Correspondents’ Club 
of Japan, Mrozcezk and LaFleur reiterated the need for the Japanese government to 
end the travel ban on non-residents (Mrozcezk, LaFleur 2020). On August 19, 2020, 
the American Chamber of Commerce in Japan, the Australian and New Zealand 
Chamber of Commerce in Japan, the British Chamber of Commerce in Japan, and 
the European Business Council issued a new joint statement on Japan blocking the 
return of foreign residents (Penn 2020). According to them, these bans “can only 
discourage foreign nationals, and the companies they work for, from investing in 
Japan” (Okutsu, Regalado 2020; Ōsumi 2020).
Despite the easing of restrictions in August, September,16 and particularly in Oc-
tober,17 the biggest challenges for foreign residents were the necessity to deal with 
a lot of complicated paperwork, as well as to acquire a negative COVID-19 test within 
seventy-two hours of the departure time (Kopp 2020b). As of November 1, 2020, for-
eign national residents with a valid re-entry permit no longer needed to provide 
the “Letter of Confirmation of Submitting Required Documentation for Re-entry into 
Japan” or the “Receipt for request of re-entry,” but they still needed to provide a test 
certificate to prove negativity to COVID-19 within seventy-two hours of departure 
for Japan (Immigration Services Agency of Japan 2020).
Such requests were addressed only to foreign citizens and not to Japanese cit-
izens, preserving the process of binary differentiation between those who are part 
of the “inside” (uchi, the natives) and those who are part of the “outside” (soto, the 
foreigners).18 A paradox is evident, especially for permanent foreign nationals, who, 
16 On September 25, 2020, the government announced that from October 1, 2020, it would 
have opened its borders to all foreign visitors who had permits to enter and stay in the coun-
try, including businesspeople and students, but not tourists (Penn 2020).
17 On October 7, 2020, Japan and South Korea resumed bilateral business travel, with short-
term business travelers not required to observe fourteen-day isolation periods if they were 
tested negative for COVID-19 and submitted their travel itineraries in advance (Penn 2020). 
However, several steps needed to be taken in all cases, such as obtaining a “Letter of Confir-
mation of Submitting Necessary Documentation for Re-Entry into Japan” from the embassy 
and a test certificate proving negativity to COVID-19 within 72 hours of departure for Japan 
(Arudou 2020d).
18 For further information about the concepts of uchi and soto, see Doi (1986).
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by definition, should have the right to stay permanently in Japan.19 Through this 
devaluation of the intrinsic value of their residency status when crossing the coun-
try’s borders, permanent foreign nationals were obliquely compared to mere tour-
ists (Arudou 2020d). The uchi-soto dynamic can also be found in the assessment of 
the virus’s discretionary infectiousness, as outlined above as regards to Japanese’s 
immunity/foreigners’ contagiousness.
CONCLUSION
What has been described so far is only part of an evolving story. At the time of writ-
ing this article (December 2020), Japan imposed a new ban on the entry of foreign 
nationals because of a new variant of COVID-19 detected in the country. The inter-
vention of one part of the international (business) community, the protests of inter-
national entrepreneurs and foreign residents, have laid the foundations for a new 
approach to old problems within Japanese society. What does not seem to change, 
however, are the processes of othering in the treatment of uchi and soto that have 
long characterized Japan. This treatment is what Arudou refers to as embedded rac-
ism of Japanese society toward the foreigner/diverse/outsider (2015). In this particu-
lar time, the difference is that, in response to criticism from the international commu-
nity, “regular Japanese racism has been replaced by a new, improved racism,” where 
borders can become more elaborated racist barriers (2020d).
These dynamics of adaptation to the peculiarities of the emergency turn out 
to be just a new form of division, a new perspective on Reischauer’s line of differ-
entiation between the dichotomy uchi and soto, between Japanese and foreigners, 
whatever legal status they hold.20 From a broader perspective, these issues conflict 
with the extent to which Japanese reality is trying to emancipate itself from the 
stereotype of insular exclusivity, its own isolationist historicity, and the concepts 
of cultural homogeneity and uniqueness (Brody 2002: 1–2). The fragility of tabunka 
kyōsei, albeit indirectly, is further reflected in the exceptional nature of border policies 
19 The measures described so far concerned all foreign nationals, with the exception of special 
permanent residents (tokubetsu-eijūsha) and, as described above, those who have special ex-
ceptional circumstances (OECD 2020). Special permanent residents are generally Korean and 
Chinese zainichi. The term zainichi refers to the group of Japan-born foreigners who have 
lived in Japan for several generations and have decided not to become naturalized. Specifi-
cally, their origins are rooted in those who migrated from colonial territories during the pe-
riod of Japanese domination of Korea, Taiwan, and part of China (Japanese colonial empire, 
1895–1945) and continue to their descendants (Lie 2008: ix–xiv; Shipper 2008: 27).
20 In a recent interview on the topic of migrant workers in the Japanese labor market with the 
Tōzen Union, its executive chairman, Okunuki Hifumi, and its Chief Financial Officer and 
founder, Louis Carlet confirmed that in Japanese society a basic assumption is present about 
the division between what is “inside” (Japanese) and what is “outside” (foreigner). According 
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under the stress of the pandemic. The same can be said for foreign workers living in 
Japan, as well as those who planned to migrate to or to invest economically within 
the archipelago.
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POVZETEK
VSTOP ZAVRNJEN: JAPONSKE MEJNE OMEJITVE V ČASU IZREDNIH 
RAZMER MED PANDEMIJO COVIDA-19
Nicola COSTALUNGA
Globalna zdravstvena kriza, ki je izbruhnila leta 2020, je bila resen preizkus za šte-
vilne nacionalne ekonomske, družbene in zdravstvene sisteme. Pandemija je po-
metla z gotovostjo človekovega vsakdanjega življenja in močno ogrozila splošni 
življenjski slog, tržno dinamiko in uveljavljene politike. Čeprav je bila sporna narava 
antivirusnih ukrepov enaka za vse, je novi koronavirus obstoječo družbeno neena-
kost še povečal in ustvaril pomembno vrzel med različnimi družbenimi neravno-
vesji, segmentacijo trga dela in drugimi vrstami neenakosti. Poleg že obstoječih so 
se pojavile še nove prepreke. 
Vse te spremembe so prizadele tudi Japonsko, ki je z uvedenimi ukrepi za za-
jezitev virusa zaprla državo in po politični presoji tujce obravnavala drugače kot do-
mačine. Posebnost omenjenih političnih odločitev je bila, da so prizadele tudi ljudi z 
dovoljenjem za stalno (kot tudi za dolgoročno) bivanje, ki imajo zato že po definiciji 
pravico do stalnega bivanja na Japonskem. Ti politični ukrepi so med redkimi, ki vse 
tuje državljane obravnavajo enako, ne glede na njihovo strokovno usposobljenost. 
Članek osvetljuje ukrepe Japonske v zvezi s tujimi državljani in odziv na varnos-
tno in zdravstveno situacijo, ki je že obstoječe probleme in rasna vprašanja še za-
ostril. Prvi del članka povzema splošno teorijo dinamike migracijskih in nadzornih 
politik, nato pa se podrobneje ukvarja z diferenciranimi ukrepi, vprašanji mejnega 
nadzora in s kulturnimi posebnostmi dežele. V drugem delu opisuje dogodke, pov-
ezane s prepovedjo ponovnega vstopa tujih državljanov na Japonsko leta 2020, 
hkrati pa analizira trende diferenciacije v sodobni japonski družbi. Avtor članek 
konča z razmišljanji o družbeni diferenciaciji na Japonskem danes in z napovedmi 
za prihodnost. 
Nicola COSTALUNGA
